A Betrayal of Trust and Honor.........

[JME]

I, as a career Marine, am still having a difficult time accepting the fact that the organization which I served for the majority of my adult life would stoop to the levels they have in this Camp Lejeune water contamination incident. I can understand how some of you would balk at the thought of our beloved Corps knowingly violating their own regulations and knowingly poisoning their own people. Not to mention their conduct and willfull actions in attempting to cover this up after the fact. The sad truth is that they are guilty of all the above. Their own documents don't lie, I encourage all of you to read the "time line" which is linked on our home page. None of the statements or facts on that time line are speculation, they are the facts taken directly from the military's own documents, the document numbers are listed at the end of each entry. Please note that this time line only covers the time period from when the base was created up through the time that Camp Lejeune was declared a "Super Fund" site by the USEPA. There are approximately 15,000 more documents which we need to go through and place in chronological order so we can take the time line from 1990 to present.

This posting will be a running dialogue of the lies, half truths, mis-information, and dis-information in the USMC's and the Department of the Navy's attempts to bury the truth in this tragic incident. Each betrayal will be listed by date, specifics, and the document numbers which support it. I would advise all of you to write to the ATSDR's Camp Lejeune web-site address and request the CD's they have produced of the Camp Lejeune water documents. Your possession of these CD's is important, that way when your local press wants proof of what you are telling them, you can provide them the official documents!

Keep watching, we will start listing these incidents shortly...........Jerry Ensminger

P.S; Bounce our time-line against those that had been published by the USMC. There is little wonder why they pulled their time-lines off their web-site. The one luxury that we have in this situation is the fact that the USMC and the Department of the Navy told most of their lies up front and in writing. The USMC is now relying on the time-line that was published by the GAO which has already been proven to be a farce!

[Mpartain]

On December 12 1984 a small five paragraph article appeared in the Marine Corps publication called the Globe. The article was titled “Camp Lejeune water testing underway.” This article was the opening gambit in a Marine Corps public relations campaign that continues to this day. The sole purpose of this campaign is to protect the Marine Corps from any negative publicity or liability as a result of the water contamination aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune. The December 1984 article began this campaign with the statement that “None of the organic compounds noted in the test samples are listed in the regulations under the Safe Water Drinking Act.”

On April 30, 1985 The Commanding General , Maj. Gen Buehl, of Camp Lejeune issued a notice to the residents of Tarawa Terrace. The notice carefully and deliberately pointed out that “There are no definitive State or Federal regulations regarding a safe level of these compounds.” This statement was made after two supply wells at Tarawa Terrace were taken off line due to presence of organic compounds in the water. To date, the position of the Marine Corps is that their water met all Federal standards that were in force at that time and they did nothing wrong. It is the constant drum beat heard in every press release issued by the Marine Corps. Like many Marine Corps “official” statements, it sounds true but under further scrutiny it dissolves into yet another lie.

On June 12, 2007 a document surfaced during the Congressional hearings concerning Camp Lejeune. This document was previously concealed from the public by the Marine Corps. The document was a set of instructions from the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) to establish standards for potable water and potable water distributions systems throughout the Navy. This included all Naval/USMC installations and U.S. Navy vessels afloat at sea.

Here is a link to the 1972 Bumed located in the document section of our website.

http://tftptf.com/CLW_Docs/CLW0144.pdf

It is a known fact that the military was given the flexibility by our Federal government to establish and maintain their own internal justice system, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Because they were allowed to operate with this UCMJ, each branch of service was required to create and maintain a system of laws that were unique to that branch of service. This was accomplished through written and published orders/instructions. The USMC was unique in that they were part of the Department of Navy (DoN), they depend on the DoN for all Medical, Dental, and facilities/utilities requirements. By virtue of this dependence, the USMC also came under the purview of many Navy orders/instructions. Such was the case with the drinking water systems, BUMED Instruction 6240.3 was a law that the U. S. Navy created which provided regulations pertaining to potable water and drinking water systems on USN/USMC installations. This document provided very strict/detailed regulations for the operation of drinking water systems. Had the regulations outlined in this document been followed, most of this Camp Lejeune tragedy would have been averted.

What the Marine Corps and the DoN fail to tell us and the public, is that they were in gross violation of their own laws!

In September of 1963, BUMED issued 62430.3B. The new instructions were substantially revised from the prior version (6240.3A). Within the new revisions were definitions and examples to prevent misinterpretation of instruction. For example, the definition of a health hazard was expanded to include an example. The example cites a structural defect in the water supply system by either location, design or construction that prevents the satisfactory purification of the water or causes it to be polluted from extraneous sources (such as was the case at Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point). Pollution was defined as the presence of any foreign substance (organic, inorganic, radiological or biological) in the water which tends to degrade its quality so as to constitute a hazard. The instruction also requires substances which may have a deleterious (harmful) physiological effect or for which the physiological effects are not known, shall not be introduced into the water system in a manner which would permit them to reach the consumer. Water supply wells are defined within the instruction as part of the water system.

The language in this standard created an obligation for the Navy/USMC to protect users of its water systems from pollution regardless of whether the effects of this pollution were known or yet to be discovered. The burden was placed upon the Navy/USMC to ensure the water was safe.

Then in 1972, BUMED revised the instruction to include yet more preventive measures to ensure the safety of the water system. “The presence of the following substances in excess of the concentrations listed shall constitute grounds for rejection of the supply:” Chlorinated Hydrocarbons were listed with a value of 3-100ppb. While not specifically names in the instruction, PCE, TCE and organic pesticides are chlorinated hydrocarbons.

The existence of BUMED 6240.3B and 3C destroys any credibility in any assertion that the Marine Corps and the Department of the Navy were following the law. BUMED 6240.3B and 3C is so damning to the Marine Corps and the DoN that it was not even mentioned in the Government Accountability Report of May 2007.

A final testament to the legal liability created by the existence of BUMED 6240.3B and 3C occurred exactly four years after the water contamination aboard Camp Lejeune was officially announced to the public. On December 5, 1988 the Naval Medical Command issued NAVMEDCOM Instruction 6240.1 Standards for Potable Water and Potable water systems. This instruction canceled BUMED 6240.3C and replaced it with a set of instructions that were in compliance with State and Federal water regulations at the time but lacked the “teeth” found in the prior BUMED. Gone were the examples and definitions found in the older instructions that created the legal duty for the Navy to protect consumers of their water systems from the effects of pollution whether these effects were known or unknown.

In short, the cancellation of BUMED 6240.3C removed the burden to ensure the potable water produced at Camp Lejeune or any Navy facility/vessel was safe for consumption from the Navy/USMC and placed that burden upon the Federal Government through the Safe Drinking Water Act.

When asked about BUMED 6240.3B and 3C instruction at the last CAP meeting, Lt Col Tencate at first said nothing. A second question followed as to whether they (Navy/USMC) were following the BUMED. Again there was silence, then as the conversation shifted I heard Lt. Col Tencate say softly under his breath “Yes, we think we were.”

I wonder why he did not say it loudly for all of us to hear? After all the truth is the truth, isn't it? Then again, when the truth involves Camp Lejeune and the contaminated water, it may not be a good idea for the Marine Corps to be totally truthful.

Mike Partain

[Mpartain]

We now have most of the CLW documents on line in our library. I attached a link to the prior post on this entry where you can now view the actual BUMED 6240.3C instruction for yourself.

Feel free to view the CLW document library in the historical document section of this website. These are actual Marine Corps Documents. We will be updating the timeline shortly so that you can reference the documents as you read the timeline of events.

I am a former teacher and my degree is in history. Knowledge is power. Over the past year, I have read everything I could get my hands on from the Marine Corps. As I read these documents and saw what happened for myself, the more resolute and determined I became.

My resolve is not to allow the USMC to cover up what they did at Camp Lejeune. They left us all out there to suffer and die. This is not the Marine Corps my grandfather and father served. I firmly believe that if the rank and file Marine truly knew what has happened and continues to happen, they would be appalled and heads would roll!

Mike Partain

[Mpartain]

The heavily biased and inaccurate 2007 Government Accountability Office report into Camp Lejeune was meant to be the instrument by which the Camp Lejeune water contamination issue was silenced once and for all. One of the many inaccuracies contained within the report was this contention concerning yet another flawed and biased inquiry into Camp Lejeune by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

“the panel concluded that Camp Lejeune provided residents with drinking water at a level of quality consistent with general utility practices at the time. However, the panel noted that while Camp Lejeune made every effort to comply with existing regulations, it did not anticipate or independently evaluate health risks associated with chemicals such as TCE and PCE that were not yet regulated,”

Once again there is no discussion of BUMED 6240.3b and 3c which if followed, would have averted a majority of the exposures at Camp Lejeune. The second sentence carefully cultivates the impression that PCE and TCE were “unknowns” at the time (1980’s) and despite every effort by the Marine Corps to be diligent in their stewardship of the water systems aboard Camp Lejeune, they were innocently caught unawares by these new rogue chemicals in the water. This is also the position that the Marine Corps has adopted as their defense against our claims of their gross negligence.

During my research to compile and write the timeline for the Camp Lejeune Water Contamination timeline, I came across an odd document. The cover page referred to an expired base hazardous waste order. The second page of this document completely refutes the GAO report and the Marine Corps position that they did not know about the potential for these chemicals (PCE and TCE) to be in the ground water and ultimately the potable water aboard Camp Lejeune.

Base Order 5100.13b was written by the Commanding General of Camp Lejeune on June 27, 1974. This order was the second in a series of orders from the Commanding General concerning the safe disposal of contaminants or hazardous wastes aboard the base and ultimately, were the result of a directive from Head Quarters Marine Corps. Unfortunately, we do not have a copy of the prior versions of the order at this time.

http://tftptf.com/CLW_Docs/CLW5996.pdf

“Purpose (of Base Order 5100.13b). To set forth the responsibilities for the safe disposal of subject waste such as ORGANIC SOLVENTS, deteriorated cleaning solutions, poisonous chemical waste, corrosives, acids, gases, and any unstable compounds considered to be hazardous. ~

Improper practices of disposal create hazards such as deterioration of recreational value of lakes and streams (and) contamination of drinking water.”

The existence of this document completely contradicts the Marine Corps contention that they were unaware of the potential for ground water contamination by these chemicals and thusly, could not reasonably anticipate that these chemicals could make their way into the potable water at Camp Lejeune.

In fact, the existence of this order propels a case of simple negligence into one of gross negligence perpetrated by the Marine Corps. Base Order 5100.13b further reinforces the proactive and protective measures found in the BUMED 6240 instructions. The order clearly demonstrates a clear relationship between the misuse and dumping of organic solvents (PCE and TCE are organic solvents) and other chemicals/hazardous materials on the base and contamination of the drinking water. As users of PCE and TCE, the Marine Corps should have known that their use of the chemical on the base and the existence of other sources of this chemical off base were endangering the base’s water supply. The fuel farm at Hadnot Point comes to mind. Finally, the well field for Tarawa Terrace was located across the street and down gradient from auto repair shops and more ominously, several dry cleaners.

All the Marine Corps had to do was look across the street and follow the BUMED 6240.3b instruction. The Marine Corps had all the knowledge and tools in place to protect us from our exposure to these chemicals in their drinking water.

[Mpartain]

Facts are troubling things.

They are often inconvenient obstacles for those who seek to change them.

The language contained in the Navy’s lawful regulation, Bumed 6240.3B and 3C, created an obligation for the Navy/USMC to protect users of their water systems from pollution regardless of whether the effects of this pollution were known or yet to be discovered beginning in 1963. This is a fact and this fact can not be changed, diluted or manipulated to favor any other point of view than the Navy/USMC failed in their duty to safeguard the water supply aboard Camp Lejeune.

By the Marine Corps own admission, Base Order 5100.13B of June 1974, there was an awareness that improper disposal of organic solvents would lead to contamination of drinking water. The fact is just one example in a mountain of evidence that the Marine Corps was not fulfilling the duties of BUMED 6240.3b(C). The wells at Tarawa Terrace were left in production even though they were located down gradient and in close proximity to known pollution sources including ABC One Hour Dry Cleaners. What excuse can be offered to explain why in 1972, well HP 651 was placed into production immediately adjacent to the base disposal yard (Lot 201 and 203) and in close proximity to where the base was disposing used TCE and other solvents? The only word to describe the actions of the Marine Corps and its operational practices regarding their potable water distribution system is negligence.

Negligence is defined simply as the failure to use reasonable care. Gross negligence is a conscious and voluntary disregard of the need to use reasonable care, which is likely to cause foreseeable grave injury or harm to persons, property, or both. One can argue that the Navy/USMC is negligent for allowing the contamination to continue after 1963. However. A more disturbing argument can be made after the Base Order 5100.13B was published. From 1974, the USMC was grossly negligent in the operation of their water distribution systems aboard the base. The USMC had regulations in place to prevent the contamination and by 1974 they had orders indicating that organic solvents were potential contaminates of the drinking water aboard the base. Why were they not implementing the preventive measures found in the BUMED 6240.3C? Furthermore, there can be no doubt that after October 30, 1980 that the Navy/USMC was grossly negligent, if not criminally negligent in their conduct and operation of their potable water supply systems aboard the base. This was the date which the Marine Corps was first warned that at least one of their water systems aboard Camp Lejeune was highly contaminated with chlorinated hydrocarbons...PCE and TCE. After that date, the Navy/Marine Corps knew they were poisoning their own people and they did nothing to stop it until December 1984 -March 1985.

On October 1st 1980, representatives from LantDiv arrived at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune to collect a composite sample from all eight water treatment plants in an effort to make sure there was no “Love Canal” present aboard the base. Seven months prior to this visit the State of North Carolina assumed primacy for the enforcement of the Safe Water Drinking Act within the borders of the state including Camp Lejeune. What could be more embarrassing for the Navy/USMC than to have the State of North Carolina “discover” a problem aboard the base without their knowledge of its existence, even though the Navy/USMC was responsible the testing and safe guarding their own water system aboard the base prior to 1980. Unpleasant facts sometimes spur action. The fact is that up until October 1980, the Navy/USMC had no idea of what was going on in their water systems aboard the base even though they were compelled to do so by BUMED 6240.3B(C).

The samples were collected that day and transported to two separate labs. Available documents do not indicate the time frame between sampling and actual testing or whether they were preserved in ice to ensure accuracy. Furthermore, there is no indication of how the samples were weighted. All we know is that water from all eight treatment plants were placed together as one composite sample.

The results were in by October 30th 1980. Jennings Lab reported the presence of several chemicals including Tetrachloroethylene and Trichlororethylene just at detection levels. What is more disturbing was the handwritten note found on the second lab’s analytical result sheet from lab chief William Neal. “Water is highly contaminated with low molecular weight halogenated hydrocarbons.” No action was taken.

According to the Navy’s own documents http://tftptf.com/CLW_Docs/CLW0613.pdf , if a potential problem was identified, then further testing on all eight individual systems was warranted in order to determine the source of the problem. Then, why was there no action taken? Clearly the existence of these chemicals in the composite water test results was a potential problem that should require further testing. After all, BUMED 6240.3B(C) was in force and clearly provided a standard by which the Navy/USMC had to follow. The existence of the BUMED 6240.3B(c) obligated the Navy/USMC to look further. They did NOTHING!

The fact that the Navy/Marine Corps did nothing can not be changed. It can not be changed no matter how inconvenient the truth maybe for Navy/USMC. It was interesting to see Lt Col. Tencate’s reaction to Dan Rather’s questioning on this point.

Part 2 at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9r_r-Ky8lTs

The Lt. Col stated that “the chemicals were first discovered in the early 1980’s. It was not until late 1984 early 1985 that it (PCE/TCE) was actually discovered in the wells.”

Dan Rather followed up with “I want to make sure I understand you, as soon as it was known that TCE and PCE was in the wells at what ever level, they were shut down?”

Lt Col Tencate responded “The base was trying to discover the source, as soon as they discovered the source of the chemicals was a well, that well was shut down.”

Where are the facts to explain the four and a half year gap between the first warning in October 1980 and the closure of the contaminated wells? I will explore these facts in my next posting.

Mike Partain

[Mpartain]

The blue highlighted words are links to the documents referred to in the text. Click on the word to access the document.

Up until March of 1980 the State of North Carolina had very little if any authority over Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune (MCBCL) concerning the potable water systems aboard the base. This date represents a major change in the relationship between the State and MCBCL. For the base, the change in the law which gave the State of North Carolina primacy in enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act meant that an unwelcome set of eyes were now allowed access to Marine Corps activities aboard the base for better or worse. As indicated in a February 1978 Memo titled Primacy of Safe Drinking Water Act, the base was required to submit all monitoring data, operational logs, requests for either laboratory certification or special analysis to the State. This meant that if there was a problem with the potable water aboard the base, it would not only be a Marine Corps problem but a State of North Carolina problem. Any such problem would require the State’s involvement aboard the base.

The first real test of this new arrangement between the State and MCBCL occurred between March 1981 through August 1981. The problem was the chemical dump (also known as site 69) and the Rifle Range potable water distribution system (WDS).

The problem with the Rifle Range potable water distribution system was its close proximity to a registered and known toxic dump site and thus “on the radar” for potential problems. Changes in the Federal Registry in 1978 precipitated increase monitoring for known solid waste and chemical landfills. This comes as no surprise, especially after the horror uncovered at Love Canal earlier that year. This change in the Federal Register should have been no surprise for the Marine Corps. In fact, as we discussed earlier, the Marine Corps had their own regulations in place to prevent such a contamination event from occurring as early 1963 (BUMED 6240.3B). Nevertheless, in September 1978 LantDiv wrote MCBCL and advised the base ”Because groundwater is used extensively as potable water source at Camp Lejeune, current land disposal facilities should be monitored to indicate as early as possible, any movement of contaminants from either disposal facility into the groundwater”.

The first specific documentation of testing at the Rifle Range WDS that I can find occurred on March 31, 1981 when the new base Supervisory Chemist, Elizabeth Betz, sampled the area around the Chemical Dump at the direction of LantDiv. What they found was high levels of Contamination present in the test wells around the dump and near the Rifle Range WDS.

This test occurred five months after the first Army Lab warning that Hadnot Point’s potable water was highly contaminated with Chlorinated Hydrocarbons and twenty two days after the third warning from the Army Lab that SOLVENTS! were in the potable water at Hadnot Point.

LantDiv responded to the alarming news at the Chemical Dump by sending its new Environmental Engineer, Jerry Wallmeyer to the base in order to obtain samples from the dump and the nearby Rifle Range WDS. The plant was in close proximity to a registered dump and thus a concern to LantDiv and the base. The results of the tests revealed lower levels of contamination and the presence of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the Rifle Range’s water distribution system. Supervisory Chemist Betz advised her superior that there was a concern over faulty pumps, changes in weather conditions and differences in sampling procedures may have contributed to the lower levels in the second sampling. At Jerry Wallmeyer’s recommendation, a third round of sampling at the Chemical Dump and Rifle Range was scheduled.

This time, Mr. Wallmeyer’s supervisor, Paul Rakowski, was sent to the base to obtain the samples. Once again contamination was found, levels are reduced but still present in the test wells and the Rifle Range’s WDS. Once again Betz was concerned enough over how the samples were collected to document in writing that the samples were not preserved in ice at the recommendation of Mr. Rakowski. Volatile organic compounds quickly dissipate if not preserved for sampling.

The results of the three tests were evaluated at LantDiv and their recommendations were then sent to MCBCL in the form of a letter from J.R. Bailey to the Commanding General attention to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities. The letter provides an analysis of the ground water, surface water and potable waters and more importantly how to deal with the problem of organic contamination in the Rifle Range’s potable water system.

1. Mr. Bailey recommended no further action to be taken concerning the TTHM or organic problem at the Rifle Range water system at that time. Mr. Bailey then stated that MCBCL was scheduled for an Initial Assessment Study for the NACIP program to begin in FY-82. Mr. Bailey advised that the information in his letter and the TTHM monitoring program will be utilized by the Initial Assessment Study (IAS) team.

2. The results of the analysis should be passed to local and state officials.

3.The letter and the accompanying enclosures did not contain any of the March readings taken by Elizabeth Betz. These results were dismissed as invalid due to a suspected contamination of the containers and improper sampling techniques.

4. Rifle Range well RR-97, which tested positive for organic ontamination, should not be used. Preference should be given to using wells RR-45 and RR-47 because of lower levels of organic contamination found in their samples.

5. Suggested No Action Response Levels (SNARLS) recommendations from the EPA concerning PCE and TCE are given to the base. They include recommendations for one day, ten day and long term SNARLS. The long terms Snarl for PCE was 20 ppb and TCE was 75ppb.

6. USAEHA TTHM sampling/analysis was expanded to include the Rifle Range water distribution system.

As requested by LantDiv, the Commanding General MCBCL, Major General Cooper, then advised Charles Rundgren at N.C. State Division of Health Services that based on laboratory analysis, the Rifle Range water system met current drinking water standards. There was no mention of the organic chemical contamination found in the Rifle Range water distribution system. The data from the 30 March testing indicating high levels of contaminants was left out of the letter to the state. General Cooper advised the base will continue to monitor the water system on a monthly basis. The letter also advised the state that the base was scheduled to undergo and Initial Assessment Study (IAS) in FY 1982 to identify assess and control contamination at the base.

On paper, MCBCL was fulfilling the role of concerned and responsible community member to the State of North Carolina. In reality, officials at the base and LantDiv were only telling officials at the State what they wanted to hear. I.E. there was nothing wrong with the water at MCBCL. The General’s August 1981 letter to the State was written solely because the Rifle Range was in close proximity to the Chemical Dump. This fact forced officials at LantDiv and the base to act because if a violation was discovered with the Rifle Range WDS and the base had not reported any potential problem or a problem to the State, then that would open the door for the State to force their way into MCBCL and see for themselves what was going on within the confines of the base. This unpleasant reality was something that LantDiv and MCBCL wanted to avoid at all costs, even if it meant poisoning users of the base’s potable water system.

To prove my point, one only has to review the USAEHA Army lab reports concerning Hadnot Point and ask themselves what did the base and LantDiv do about this water distribution system which served the barracks, mess halls, the hospital, and family living quarters and compare their actions there to what occurred at the Rifle Range, which did not serve any permanent residents.

The answer is simple, LantDiv and Base officials did NOTHING because no one at the State was looking or concerned with Hadnot Point*. The State was unaware of the trichloroethylene interference at Hadnot Point and as far as the State knew, they had no reason to be concerned with Hadnot Point's water. The State would continue to remain ignorant of the trichloroethylene problem aboard the base until something changed in the Safe Drinking Water Act which would compel LantDiv and base officials to inform the State of a problem. That change did not occur until the summer of 1984.

In June of 1984, the EPA published a proposed recommended maximum containment level (RCML) for PCE and TCE. The EPA ominously observed that volatile organic chemicals are man made chemicals and their presence may indicate that a pollution incident has occurred. In July 1984, Environmental Science and Engineering tested and found VOCs in potable water well 602 at Hadnot Point. Mysteriously, many documents from July 1984 through December 1984 are missing. We do not know what transpired between the Navy's environmental contractor and LantDiv/base officials. What we do know is that for five months this highly contaminated well was left operational until it was finally shut down in November of 1984. Why?

* During this time, the Tarawa Terrace water distribution system was not tested for trihalomethanes. The TTHM testing was the basis for the warnings generated for Hadnot Point's water discussed in the text above because trichloroethylene was interfering with the accuracy of the TTHM test results. Testing for TTHMs at Tarawa Terrace began in 1982 and will be the subject of my next posting.

Mike Partain

[Mpartain]

Bureaucracies are notorious purveyors of injustice throughout history. They are often cloaked in secrecy and jaded with a complete contempt for those they are suppose to serve and protect. The sole mission of a tempered and tried bureaucrat is not to make waves in order to survive and work another day. The civilian arm of the government service which ran the utilities branch aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune is no exception to this generality. This is not to say that everyone who worked in the department was corrupt or did not care, that is and was not the case. The problem resided within the seasoned “career” management personnel in base maintenance, some of which are still employed at the base. Employees who spoke out, displayed individual initiative or attempted to protect those they served, were crushed and ruthlessly persecuted, often at the cost of their job. A government job aboard a large military installation such as Camp Lejeune was and is a lucrative endeavor, especially in Jacksonville North Carolina. Employees quickly learned that they were expendable and thus to keep their mouths shut or else.

The last documented USAEHA Army Lab warning for the Hadnot Point water distribution system was received in December of 1981. The analytical sheets read “interference on this peak.” Due to problems with equipment and a large back log of tests, the Army lab was unable to perform any further testing for TTHM after this date. A replacement was needed and in April 1982, Grainger Labs was contracted to perform the required testing for the base. In their contract with the base, Grainger was required to test the potable water for all eight water distribution systems aboard the base including both Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace. The first samples were collected on April 19, 1982 and sent to Grainger for testing.

The actual analytical sheets from the April samples are missing but we do have record of what transpired when the results were received on May 6th 1982. On that day, Mike Hargett of Grainger Labs personally called Base Supervisory Chemist Elizabeth Betz and informed her that peaks for Perclene (PCE) and trichloroethylene (TCE) (see page CLW 5179) which are synthetic organic cleaning solvents, were found in the Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point Samples. Hargett informed Betz that the values for the bromodichloromethane peak would be lower because of TCE interference and asked if this would be acceptable. Betz informed him that it was acceptable and Hargett ended the conversation with an assurance that there would be no mention of the extra peaks (PCE and TCE) except for the lesser value on the report.

Betz, following procedure, then notified the Supervisory Ecologist, Danny Sharpe, of the Grainger findings and these findings were then sent up the chain of command to Billy Elston, Deputy Base Maintenance Officer and to the Utilities Director Fred Cone. These men were (Fred Cone still works in utilities) civilian utility employees of the base. Betz was doing her duty and notified her superiors of a potential problem with the base’s potable water system. Unlike the Rifle Range water treatment system, Betz was the point person in this new TTHM testing information and even though she was still a junior employee of the civil service, she knew enough to know that if something went wrong she was the “fall gal” because the chain of knowledge started with her. Thankfully, Betz was savvy enough to keep detailed memorandums of what was transpiring and thus this is how we now know some of the details of what transpired during those critical months of 1982.

Betz was probably not surprised when she was called to attend a briefing for the base’s command staff concerning April’s TTHM analysis. The briefing was held a week after Betz’s memorandum to her superior and she was asked to attend the briefing in order to explain what the new testing requirements for TTHMs meant to Col Millice and Lt Col. Fitzgerald. Betz fully expected to be asked about the PCE and TCE peaks found in the Grainger Lab sampling. Instead what happened next shocked her enough to document in her memorandum (See page CLW 5179) “it appeared to me that they had not been informed about the findings. I did not inform them.” Betz was shocked but she was not stupid. She saw the handwriting on the wall and knew what it meant. This was something to keep in house and not to be discussed. Nevertheless she continued to write her memorandums for the record. Betz attempted to do the right thing; she stood up and spoke out but with no support from her superiors, it would have been the end of her new career if she persisted.

Shortly after the briefing, a second round of TTHM sampling was collected for Camp Lejeune. However some of these samples had problems with air bubbles and interfered with the testing performed by Grainger Labs. A new round was collected and sent to Grainger. Nonetheless, Mike Hargett and Grainger labs found that the solvent peaks discovered in the April samples were still present but the comparison with the duplicate samples indicated poor repeatability. Unquestioned confirmation was needed. They agreed to collect yet another sample for testing. This sample was taken at the end of June. The Grainger Lab report indicated interference in one of the samples but there is no explanation of what was causing the interference. As a result of the continued interference Betz and Gaines Huneycut collected samples from both the Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point water treatment plants for special testing of these two systems. One sample was taken from the raw water entering the plant and the other from the treated water. The results from these samples would clearly demonstrate whether the interference problem was at the water treatment plant(s) or with the raw water supplied to the plants. If the raw water showed evidence of PCE/TCE contamination, there could be only one logical conclusion, the contamination was in the ground water supplying the base! The samples were collected and packed in ice and then shipped to Grainger Labs in Raleigh North Carolina.

Immediately following the sample shipment, Betz called the state of North Carolina and spoke to Linda Sewall concerning TTHM reporting requirements. At the end of the conversation, Betz asked Sewall about what Safe Drinking Water Act Secondary Contaminants were required to be reported. Tetrachloroethylene and trichloroethylene were not listed among the SDWA secondary contaminants. Betz did not inform Ms. Sewall that PCE and TCE were found in the potable water aboard the base.

The Grainger report arrived at the base on August 10th 1982. “Interferences which were thought to be chlorinated hydrocarbons hindered the quantitation of certain trihalomethanes. These appeared to be at high levels and hence more important from a health standpoint than the total trihalomethane content. For these reasons we called the situation to the attention of Camp Lejeune personnel.” The Grainger Lab memo documented in writing that the contamination in the potable water systems aboard the base was a serious issue. Grainger’s chemist, Bruce Babson, correctly concluded that the contaminants were in the well fields for both Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point. If the contamination was emanating from wells there could be but one logical conclusion. The groundwater supplying the wells aboard the base was contaminated!

Lets revisit the official Marine Corps explanation given to Congress, the public and media. On October 21st 2008, Lt Col. Tencate told Dan Rather “the chemicals were first discovered in the early 1980’s. It was not until late 1984 early 1985 that it (PCE/TCE) was actually discovered in the wells.” Ironically, Bruce Babson was never interviewed by the authors of the GAO report. This report was used to bolster’s the Marine Coprs claim that they did not know where the contamination was coming from until 1984-1985.

Betz incorrectly speculates or is provided with a scenario by her superiors to explain away the PCE in the base's potable water. This scenario is based on a 1980 Suggested Action Guidance Report on Tetracholorethylene issued by the EPA, that the contamination could be a result of asbestos coated water pipes. There was no documented action taken to test this theory. This explanation for the PCE readings in the potable water was mentioned only in passing by Betz. It was as if this was the "official" explanation given to her and the matter was dropped. Furthermore, the theory does not match up with what was concluded in Babson’s report. Babson concluded that the contaminate in the Hadnot Point well field was trichloroethylene and tetrachloroethylene. PCE is the substance used in asbestos coated pipes. What could possibly explain the presence of both chemicals? TCE was not used in the manufacturing of asbestos coated pipes. The asbestos coated pipe theory was on shaky ground even as it was put on paper. All Betz, or any official at LantDiv or the base, had to do was to refer to the Navy's BUMED 6240.3C instruction and investigate. The question remains, why did they not go out and test the individual well fields to determine which wells were contaminated?

No further action was taken by Betz, Base Maintenance, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities or by LantDiv.

At this point the base was on a quarterly sampling program for TTHM. The next sample period was in November of 1982. The TTH samples for the base were collected and sent to Grainger Labs for testing. Once again Grainger noted that trichloroethylene and tetrachloroethylene were interfering with the testing for TTHMs. Later that month, Betz called Bruce Babson to discuss a grammatical error on his report. During the conversation Babson expressed his concern over the solvents previously found in the potable water samples. Babson advised “the levels had dropped for a while, however in the last sample; the levels were relatively high again.” This insight from Grainger’s chemist effectively killed the asbestos coated pipe hypothesis and meant that the contamination in the potable water system was the result of groundwater contamination in the well fields. Contamination from asbestos coated pipes would be constant and would not spike and then drop for no reason. Betz knew what her conversation with Babson meant and documented it in a memorandum for the record. Betz then in one last attempt to raise the alarm, Betz forwarded her memo to her superior Julian Wooten.

The routing slip pinned to Betz’s memo provides a brief glimpse to what happened next. It was reviewed and then forwarded to the base’s Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities (Col J.T. Marshall) who then requested the base Environmental Engineer Robert Alexander to look into the “subject matter.” The December 1982 memorandum for the record is the last memorandum that we have from Elizabeth Betz. Her prolific record keeping ends abruptly at this point. It does not take a rocket scientist to understand what happened after Bob Alexander saw her memo. Memorandums for the record create a paper trail that can be followed, such as we have done some 25 years later. What Betz did not know was that the PCE and TCE problem aboard the base was already known at LantDiv and selected officials on the base. They were already working on a plan to correct the problem without revealing the contamination to the State of North Carolina, the EPA or the very people who were using the contaminated water aboard the base.


Mike Partain

[Dennis Stoddard]

I wish to express my sincere thanks to all for their extensive research and development of the mounds of documents provided so that we who have been exposed can better defend ourselves and our families. I am a new member having just become aware of this cover up by reading the Sunday (1-11-09) edition of the Florida Times Union report. :shock:

[Mpartain]

Thanks Dennis, you and the hundreds of thousands out there who still do not know what happened aboard Camp Lejeune are the reason why are doing what we do.

My life was saved by the fortunate loving hug from my wife. The Marine Corps knew by 1997 that I had been exposed at my birth and failed to warn me. It almost cost me my life.

This is not the Marine Corps that my grandfather, father and my family loyally served.

Mike Partain

My next posting will be up shortly and will detail exactly when a cover up became a conspiracy at the hands of two former Marine Colonel's who are now comfortably enjoying their retirement.

[Mpartain]

By the fall of 1982 there were three independent laboratories, each of which had documented the presence of volatile organic compounds in the potable water supply aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune. Two of these labs had noted their findings with written warnings to LantDiv and/or the base. Bruce Babson of Grainger Laboratory correctly concluded in August 1982, that the source of the contamination for Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point systems lay in the well fields supplying the base. LantDiv, Base Maintenance and the command staff aboard the base, already demonstrated that they knew what to do and how to handle this issue based upon earlier events which transpired at the Rifle Range water distribution system in 1981. What they needed was a way to erase their paper trail and minimize the damning information that was already available, in case someone or something created a reason to go and look for it.

There are a total of five written warnings from the Army Environmental Hygiene Laboratory at Fort McPherson, Georgia between October 1980 and December 1981 (Oct 1980, Dec 1980, Feb 1981, Mar 1981, and Dec 1981 ). Each of these warnings represents an opportunity for LantDiv and base officials to intervene and stop the contamination which was poisoning the base’s water supply. The lab reports also document in writing that there was at least an awareness of a problem aboard the base. These warnings had to be explained away. In December of 1981, the Navy’s NACIP program was tasked with the responsibility to identify, assess and characterize the release of hazardous substances upon naval installations such as Camp Lejeune and prevent the very thing now occurring aboard the base.

The Initial Assessment Phase of the NACIP program began aboard Camp Lejeune in January of 1982 and involved a quick records/physical survey of the base to identify potential problem areas. The initial survey was completed by March 1982 and the scientist departed to write their reports. The scientist left the base just before Grainger Labs entered into contract with the base to provide testing for TTHMs for the base’s water supply systems and thus, unless they were told otherwise, would have been unaware of Grainger’s findings. We do not know if the scientists who wrote the IAS report for Camp Lejeune were ever informed about the reported interferences found in Camp Lejeune’s Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace’s potable water systems by these other laboratories. What we do know is that by August 25th 1982 a rough draft of the IAS report was on the desk of the Assistant Chief of Staff Facilities, Colonel J. T. Marshall, for his comments. This rough draft of the IAS report was delivered to Col J. T. Marshall roughly, two weeks after Bruce Babson’s findings of August 10th 1982 that the well fields at Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point were the respective sources for contamination of those system’s. The Army Lab findings from the prior two years posed a potential problem for the Colonel. If the IAS scientist saw the Army Lab’s warnings, then it would lead them to Grainger and then to the potable water contamination aboard the base. After all, the NACIP program was suppose to indentify these types of problems in order to protect the public health.

Colonel Marshall’s comments concerning the IAS report represent one of the, if not the first steps taken by a Marine Corps staff officer to actively conspire to conceal the water contamination aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune. The Colonel wrote “discussion of trihalomethane content of Rifle Range on page 2-18 and extensive data shown on pages 6-12 through 6-18 overly stresses relationship with hazardous material/waste disposal. It is important to note that accuracy of data provided by U.S. Army laboratory is questionable. It is recommended that the TTHM information be de-emphasized throughout the report” (CLW 6333). With one fell swoop of the pen, Colonel Marshall effectively eliminated a paper trail which should have led to the discovery of the contamination aboard Camp Lejeune by sources outside the base and LantDiv.

Eliminating the paper trail is one thing, concealing the problem which created the paper trail is another issue all together. The warnings from Grainger labs continued to be reported every time a TTHM sample was taken aboard the base (Grainger Laboratory reports Dec 1982 and March 1983). To complicate matters even further, Tarawa Terrace was experiencing low well yields and problems with inadequate water supply. Any reduction in raw water yield would have required more pumping over longer periods to provide adequate water for Tarawa Terrace. Increased pumping meant increased stress on the water table and more importantly an increase draw on the contamination plume entering Tarawa Terrace’s well fields located directly across the street and down gradient from ABC One Hour Dry Cleaner’s.

The IAS report and a base environmental engineering report were released in the beginning of April 1983. Neither report mentioned or addressed the potable water contamination found in the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace water distribution systems. The report also claimed no industrial or municipal wastes were found to be migrating onto base property (CLW page 722). LantDiv and Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune were both now on record that there were no immediate threats to human health aboard the base. This announcement represented the official position of the Marine Corps and Lantdiv to the Environmental Protection Agency, the State of North Carolina and the very civilians, service personnel and their families living and working aboard the base. According to the United States Marine Corps, Camp Lejeune’s drinking water was safe for consumption/use.

This is not to say that nothing was being done about the contamination problem. In fact something was being done, it was just being accomplished behind the scenes and under the radar of the State of North Carolina and the people aboard the base. The memorandums written by Base Supervisory Chemist Elizabeth Betz, provided us with inside knowledge (up until January of 1983) until they mysteriously cease after one of the memos was forwarded to the Base Environmental Engineer, Bob Alexander. The next documented action taken by LantDiv and base officials arrived in the form of a mysterious letter dated 10 May 1983 and was written by LantDiv’s Environmental Engineer, Jerry Wallmeyer. Some 16 years after Wallmeyer authored this letter, officials at LantDiv spent four weeks turning over their archives looking for this correspondence after the announcement of the in-utero cancer study in 1998-1999. What we do know about the Wallmeyer letter is derived from a message to LantDiv written in April of 1985. This message indicated that the Wallmeyer letter was an action plan to locate, characterize and provide recommendations on how to remediate the VOC drinking water contamination problem aboard the base before it was “officially” revealed to the State of North Carolina in December of 1984.

Twenty one days after the receipt of the Wallmeyer letter, Colonel Marshall compiled the data for what was suppose to be a routine report on the TTHM analysis for the State of North Carolina. He sent the data in the form of a letter to Charles Rundgren of the State’s Water Supply Branch. The original analytical Grainger Lab TTHM reports were not included in this letter. The letter was supposed to be a routine communication to document that the base was in compliance with the new TTHM regulations slated to take effect by November 1983. Then on June 21st 1983, Colonel Marshall received a reply from the State’s Environmental Engineer, William Elmore, which undoubtedly raised an alarm at the base and at LantDiv. Mr. Elmore thanked Colonel Marshall for the data compilation but informed him that the State required the raw analytical data on the actual forms used by Grainger Laboratory (Apr and Jun 1982, Jul-Sep 1982, Oct-Dec 1982, Jan-Mar 1983). The reports requested by Mr. Elmore were the very same reports upon which Grainger Lab had documented the existence of Tetrachloroethylene and trichloroethylene within the potable water supply systems for Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace. This letter represented a major problem for the Colonel and those who were conspiring to conceal the PCE/TCE contamination in the base’s potable water systems. Colonel Marshall stalled and did nothing. The Colonel then notified LantDiv that he had seen and concurred with the proposed scope of work detailed in the Wallmeyer letter of 10 May 1983. He requested assistance in setting up a required meeting between Government representatives aboard Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune and the contractor slated to perform the work detailed in the Wallmeyer letter.

Meanwhile, TTHM sampling taken for analysis by Grainger Lab (June 1983 and Aug 1983) indicated continued contamination aboard the base. Finally, six months after Mr. Elmore’s request for the base to produce the Grainger Laboratory analytical data sheets, the new Assistant Chief of Staff facilities. Colonel Lilley responded. Col. Lilley first called the North Carolina's water supply branch and spoke with Dick Caspers. We do not know what was said in the conversation with Mr. Caspers, but two weeks later, Col Lilley wrote Mr. Elmore and advised him that per this conversation, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune was not required to provide the requested Grainger Laboratory reports and thus they were not submitted to the State. The letter went unchallenged and somehow, the potable water supply contamination aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune went undiscovered for another year and a half.

The actions of Colonel’s Marshall and Colonel Lilley represent a conspiracy to conceal the existence of the contaminated potable water supply aboard Camp Lejeune by uniformed officers of the United States Marine Corps. Their actions, while successful in the short term would unravel within a year of Colonel Lilley’ fateful letter the State of North Carolina concealing the Grainger Laboratory reports. Unfortunately, the conspiracy initiated by these two men continues to this day.

[Jooz]

MPartain, I am also another victim of this selfish selfrighteous act of these two ignorant Colonel's who have relinquished themselves GOD with their disconcern on so many unsuspecting victims who were stationed at Camp Lejeune.

I really appreciate all your hard work in compiling all this information into readable material for the simple person that is outside this government military lingo and making it more easier to read and better understand.

I feel that this whole issue as to the seriousness of it has been hushed in the news as I just came across how serious it really is this past week and realized alot of answers to my own health problems that disabled me at the age of 50 and why I have a granddaughter who can't talk/speak words or carry on a conversation at the age of three....Very SAD...

Again, I am shocked also as the other person who posted in this forum noted.

This whole event has been very well camoflauged(msp?) and kept under cover for way tooooo long.

Thank you again for all your gallant penmanship and fighting for all who can't fight for themselves.

Jo

[Mpartain]

Thanks for the kind words, what is most important now is that we network, find each other and speak up with a collective voice against what happened to us all. The events of the past week have open the door for us to act and act we must!

I am working on my next posting for this discussion board. I had to keep silent on a few things in order not to tip off the USMC on our arguments against the 1997 Public Health Assessment which was withdrawn last week by ATSDR.

Mike

[Mpartain]

Shortly after Colonel Lilley’s response to the State of North Carolina’s request for the original Grainger Labs analytical data sheets for TTHM testing, the base collected samples for December 1983’s TTHM testing and sent them into Grainger Lab. The Hadnot Point WTP and the Naval Hospital’s Emergency room sink were among the areas tested. The results were available in January 1984. Once again Bruce Babson noted that there was something interfering with the testing on his report. From past experience we know that it was PCE and TCE and it was in all four samples taken from Hadnot Point, including the Naval Hospital’s emergency room sink.

The Confirmation phase of the NACIP program kicked off in April 1984 with a meeting at Camp Lejeune between the Navy’s contractor, Environmental Science Engineering (ESE), located in Gainesville Florida and Navy/USMC officials from LantDiv and Camp Lejeune. In May 1984 a Work and Safety Plan detailing what tasks the scientists were requested to perform for the Confirmation Study was issued. The purpose of their work was to determine whether specific toxic and hazardous materials identified in the 1983 Initial Assessment Study (IAS) were present on the base in concentrations considered to be hazardous. The contractor was required to provide LantDiv with a monthly progress report due by the 15th of each month. The final well samples were schedule to be collected by 7 July. Then by 3 August, ESE would complete their evaluation of the testing results and then complete their draft report by 27 August. The final report was scheduled to be completed and presented to LantDiv and the Marine Corps by10 September 1984.

On 7 June 1984, the base newspaper carried an article titled “Environmental Study kicks-off.” The article was meant to be an informative piece to allay any fears which may arise from the presence of ESE personnel collecting samples and drilling throughout the base. Colonel Lilley was quoted in the article “While contractor personnel will routinely wear personal protective equipment such as chemical resistant coveralls, we do not expect to expose anyone to any contaminants.” The article also read that the results of the survey were expected by August 1984.

What the Marine Corps failed to tell the readers of this article was that they were already exposed to the very contaminants the ESE scientist were looking for and the Marine Corps and LantDiv already knew the contamination was in the base’s drinking water system as early as October 1980. The Corps did nothing to protect or warn them from the danger posed by the contamination in the drinking water aboard the base.

Personnel aboard the base were completely unaware they were in any danger and as far as they knew, their Corps was looking out for them and protecting them from a possible problem which may or may not even exist. Semper Fidelis?

Even the most carefully laid plans are subject to unforeseen events which can completely disrupt their goals. Sometime during the month of June, the EPA published a proposed Recommended Maximum Containment Level (RCML) for TCE and PCE in drinking water. The Federal Registry Notice contended that “VOCs are man made chemicals; their presence may indicate that a pollution incident has occurred.” Now the cat was out of the bag. To make matters worse, “The EPA has determined that human exposures to certain VOCs via drinking water may have an adverse effect upon the health of persons, thereby warranting regulatory action.” Camp Lejeune’s drinking water problem would soon be on the State’s “radar”.

With a few clicks of a type writer, the EPA interjected a crisis into the NACIP program for Camp Lejeune. To make matters worse, the announcement came right in the middle of their contractor’s groundwater sampling of the base. A collective breath was drawn and held in LantDiv and in certain offices of the base. The one bright spot in the announcement was there was no provision requiring the Navy/USMC to report the VOC contamination to the State of North Carolina, despite the fact they already knew VOCs were present in the base’s potable water supply. For now, their terrible secret was safe.

Throughout the months of June and July 1984, ESE proceeded to sample the various monitoring and potable water wells in and around the 22 sites identified as possibly hazardous by the 1983 IAS for Camp Lejeune. On 6 July, ESE sampled the wells around Site 22, the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. Among the wells sampled was Hadnot Point water supply well number 602 (HP 602). The samples were packed in ice and sent to ESE’s lab in Gainesville Florida. A week later, as scheduled in the Work and Safety Plan, the third progress report arrived at LantDiv from ESE. The report was directed to the Engineer in Charge, Jerry Wallmeyer, and advised him that ESE had collected their samples but there would be a two week delay in completion of the project due to problems with filters on some of the monitoring wells for the last round of sampling. The field investigation was scheduled for completion on 4 August.

Then suddenly, the document trail ceases from August 1984 through November 30th 1984. We have been unable to locate any of the remaining ESE progress reports, draft report or final report as mentioned in the Work and Safety Plan. Unfortunately, ESE’s document warehouse suffered an extensive fire in January of 1999 and the building was destroyed along its historical records. This fire occurred a month before officials at LantDiv spent four weeks turning their archives upside down looking for the mysterious 10 May 1983 Wallmeyer letter. From other documents, we have determined this letter was an action plan from LantDiv to locate, characterize and remediate the VOC problem on the base. Note, this action plan was crafted two years before the VOC problem was revealed to the EPA, the State of North Carolina and personnel aboard the base.

What we do have is ESE’s January 1985, Evaluation of Data report. Deep within this report is a set of data values and conclusions for the 6 July 1984 Site 22 Samples at the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. Among the chemicals found in well HP 602 was benzene at 380 ppb and toluene at 10 ppb. These two VOCs are components of fuel and indicated fuel contamination of the groundwater had occurred. ESE notes in their report: “Of extreme importance is the high level of benzene (380 ug/l) detected in the sample collected from the deep water supply well No. 602. This benzene concentration far exceeds the 10 minus 5 human health risk limit of 6.6 ug/l; therefore the use of this well should be discontinued immediately.”

According to the official Marine Corps Time line well HP 602 was shut down on 30 November 1984 after results for a sample taken by the NACIP Program were received. A sample taken on 3 December 1984 indicated well HP 602 was contaminated with benzene at 121 ppb, TCE 1,600 ppb, DCE 630 ppb and PCE at 24 ppb. Ironically, there is no mention of ESE’s prior sample for well HP 602 on 6 July 1984. There is no mention of this sample (6 July 1984) or the benzene results from the December 1984 sample in the current version of the USMC’s time line. The ESE 6 July 1984 sample does not appear in any prior USMC public statement. According to the Marine Corps, they discovered well HP602 was contaminated with VOCs (note the use of benzene is avoided). Furthermore ESE’s July sample indicated only trace amounts of the organic solvents PCE, TCE and DCE were present. The December LantDiv sample also revealed that a large plume of organic solvents was located in the vicinity of well HP 602. This new plume had nothing to do with the plume containing fuel products emanating from the tank farm. .

The critical question is why did it take four months for the Marine Corps to shut down the highly contaminated well HP 602 after it was documented as contaminated? What about the other wells on the base? What about the warnings from the Army lab, Jenning’s Lab and Grainger Lab between October 1980 through January 1984? What about Bruce Babson’s August 1982 findings that the well fields for Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point were the respective sources for those system’s contamination? What about BUMED 6240.3B or C, why were they not followed? Well HP 602 was located adjacent to the fuel farm since it was constructed in 1941! According to the strict language found within the BUMED, well HP 602 and many of the other wells which were later found to be contaminated aboard the base, were unfit for use and thus should not have been allowed to provide water to their respective water treatment plants.

How many lives could have been saved if the Navy and the USMC had simply followed their own regulations in place since 1963?

Where are the missing progress reports from ESE? There is no doubt that the July 6th samples would have been known by August 15th, the next progress report. That report is missing. Judging from the conclusions stated in the Evaluation of Data report, there is no doubt that ESE warned LantDiv and Jerry Wallmeyer that something was terribly wrong with well HP 602 and if well HP 602 was contaminated, what else was out there?

The cover up was now in full swing and the worst was yet to come.

Semper Fi?

Mike Partain

[Mpartain]

The problem with the Hadnot Point fuel farm did not begin in 1984 nor did it cease with the closing of well HP 602 on 30 November 1984.

The first documented leak at the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm (HPFF) (see page pdf page 30) occurred in 1979 when 20,000 to 30,000 gallons of diesel and unleaded fuel leaked from an underground line. This leak and subsequent leaks went unreported to the State of North Carolina until 18 May 1988. Just when the HPFF first began to leak is another question. Hopefully, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry’s ongoing water modeling project will provide the answer. Base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander, determined that by May of 1988, the fuel farm was leaking an estimated 1,500 gallons of fuel per month (see pdf page 33) into the ground at Camp Lejeune.

There are no known documents indicating that base or LantDiv officials tested well HP 602 after the 1979 spill. Well HP 602 was located 1,100 feet and down gradient of the fuel farm.

A year following the fuel line leak, a condition survey for the POL facilities (see pdf page 11) aboard Camp Lejeune was completed and submitted to LantDiv on 27 June 1980. The survey was conducted by Cal Ingram from NavFacEngCom between 10-12 June 1980. Most of the engineer’s recommendations pertain to the HPFF.

“The purpose of the survey was to carefully inspect all of the existing facilities to determine deficiencies and to make recommendations for repair, rehabilitation and modernization. This has become necessary due to leakage problems, obsolescence, and environmental/safety violations.”

The engineer determined that the HPFF tanks were originally installed in 1943 and were in a general condition of corrosion and deterioration due to age, lack of cleaning and lack of maintenance. Many of the lines and valves were buried and could not be inspected. The engineer recommended that repairs be made to the facility including replacing the underground valves and piping so that proper maintenance could be performed. Mr. Ingram’s findings were then assigned a project number (LE201M) and funding was requested on 5 March 1981. Located on the bottom of the Military Construction Project Data paperwork, which requested funding for the project, there is a notation: “Impact if not provided-deterioration leakage problems and potential violation of environmental and safety standards will continue.”

During this time well HP 602 remained on line and producing water for Hadnot Point.

The June 1982 draft version of the NACIP program’s Initial Assessment study for Camp Lejeune cited the 1979 20,000-30,000 gallon fuel spill at Hadnot Point. The report also cited a concern for the potential movement of this product into the ground water. The draft report recommended (see pdf page 52) testing of well HP 602 because it was 1,100 feet down gradient of the fuel farm and pumping water for Hadnot Point’s water distribution system.

Well HP 602 was not tested at this time.

A follow up to the June 1980 inspection occurred in March of 1983 (see pdf page 29). During this evaluation, it was determined that “piece meal rehabilitation” of the facility would not be cost effective. The recommendation was made to overhaul the facility. During the design of this project (LE201M) NavFacEngCom discovered that the cost to complete the overhaul would too costly and as a result made the determination that the fuel farm was beyond its expected lifespan. The decision was made (see pdf page 2) to cancel major repairs to the fuel farm and submit a request to construct a new fuel farm under the Military Construction Program.

Well HP 602 was not tested at this time. In fact it took another year and four months for Well HP 602 to finally be tested on 6 July 1984. Even then, this well remained online and producing water until 30 November 1984, despite the fact that it was highly contaminated with benzene at 380ppb.

The USMC currently contends that “Once the source of the chemicals was determined to be the wells, the wells were immediately taken out of service.”


Mike Partain

[Mpartain]

On 10 December 1984, Base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander, called the State of North Carolina and informed Mike Bell of the Water Supply Branch that Camp Lejeune had detected benzene and trichloroethylene in four potable water supply wells aboard the base. The State was given the 3 December test results and no mention was made of the 6 July 1984 samples from well HP 602. Mr. Alexander advised that the contaminated wells had been removed from service and that they would be resampled. He further advised that some form of this information would be released to the public.

The Marine Corps base newspaper, The Globe, published an article titled “Camp Lejeune water testing underway” on 12 December 1984. The article advised that as a result of the 3 December 1984 samples, four wells in the Hadnot Point industrial area were found to contain some traces of organic compounds. It was pointed out that none of the organic compounds noted in the test samples were listed in the Safe Drinking Water Act. Base personnel were advised that testing was underway to verify whether any groundwater contaminated existed and to identify abatement measures. Mr. Alexander added that daily water samples were being taken from the water treatment plant to ensure the drinking water remained within prescribed federal and state guidelines. The article ended with a quote from Mr. Alexander. “every effort will be made to maintain the excellent quality water supply traditionally provided to residents of Camp Lejeune.” There was no mention of the fact that personnel and their families served by the Hadnot Point system had indeed been exposed to the contaminated drinking water supplied by the base. One can only wonder why the October 1980 warning from the USAEHA laboratory and the 1982 Grainger Lab warnings were ignored. Were these warnings ignored because of incompetence or by deliberate design? Only the officials at LantDiv can tell us, but they all seem to be suffering from a form of selective amnesia. This group includes the base supervisory chemist and the Marine officers in charge of facilities at the time.

On 8 January 1985, LantDiv advised the base that the remaining seven water treatment plants should be sampled to determine whether or not the VOC problem was limited to Hadnot Point. LantDiv further advised to sample 100 wells aboard the base for “Volatile Organic Analysis”. Environmental Science and Engineering was tasked to define to scope and solutions to the problem. The sampling for Hadnot Point and Holcomb Blvd began on 16 January 1985. Tarawa Terrace was sampled on 23 January 1985.

It appears from the lack of historical records indicating otherwise, that up until late January 1985, the State of North Carolina was not actively involved in the contamination aboard the base. They had been informed by telephone on 10 December but the State had not actively come onto the base and collected any samples from the Hadnot Point water distribution system. One can only speculate that the State must have thought that the base had everything under control. That perception was about to change.

The change began with two simple phone calls to the Holcomb Blvd Water distribution plant on 27 January 1985. The callers advised the plant operator that there was a fuel odor in the treated water at their homes. The operator collected a sample from each residence and checked the water reservoir. Then when the next shift appeared for work, a gasoline odor was detected in the reservoir near the auxiliary engines. A fuel line to these engines had sprung a leak and contaminated the treated water at the distribution plant. Holcomb Blvd was then shut down for cleaning and during the nine day interim a intra-connection valve between Holcomb Blvd and Hadnot Point was opened. This valve allowed water to flow from Hadnot Point for distribution within the areas served by Holcomb Blvd. Base officials thought that they had found all of the contaminated wells on the Hadnot Point system. They were wrong. They had missed one well, well HP 651 located immediately adjacent to the base junk yard and next to where the base had previously dumped large quantities of chemicals including TCE.

The lid was about to be blown off….

Mike Partain